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By EUGENE V. ROSTOW. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1962. 318 pp. $6.00.
Eugene Rostow, Dean of the Yale Law School and author of
many articles concerning the functions of the Supreme Court
and problems of constitutional law, has in this volume collected
certain of his papers published since 1945, and through this
work he addresses himself to the subjects of what are the proper
functions of the Court, what are the sources of its ideas and
authority, and how well has the Court met its responsibilities.
The title of the book is appropriate. The "sovereign prerog-
ative", paraphrasing Holmes, is the prerogative of choice, and
Dean Rostow's position is that in the exercise of the "sovereign
prerogative" the Court is not and should not be bound by rules
of law and construction and notions of policy proven unsatis-
factory by experience.
The essays which conmprise this volume are grouped in
three sections, the first of which, entitled "Sources of judge-
Made Law", is essentially a defense and exposition of the
philosophy of legal realism or sociological jurisprudence and an
advocacy of the pursuit of moral objectives in the formulation
and development of law. The viewpoint of the author is best
expressed in his own words when he says:
The position exemplified in this book considers law to
be the means through which social policies become social
action. It views law as an integral part of the process of
social change. It accepts as normal the fact that judges have
a limited but inescapable duty to make some of the deci-
sions through which law develops in response to changing
notions of policy.
To the extent that law is the framework through which society
functions, law in its development must learn from experience,
must consider man and his needs in the light of the advances
made in the social sciences, and must respond to national ob-
jectives. Using the recent decisions on civil liberties and
segregation as illustrations of the proper application of the
philosophy of legal realism, the author argues for a "result
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oriented, sociological jurisprudence, rather than a mechanical
one."
In the second section of the book, entitled "The Nature and
Legitimacy of Judicial Review", Dean Rostow answers the
critics of the Court who contend that it should exercise
greater self-restraint and give greater deference to the positions
of Congress, the Executive and the States. To those who indict
the Court on the ground that it is -making law rather than
interpreting and applying it, the author replies that it is the duty
of judges to relate law to the changing needs of society. Law is
not a stagnant pool but a running stream and it is not improper
for judges to influence the direction of the stream. Nor is it
undemocratic in and of itself, Rostow contends, for judges to
obstruct the will of Congress, an elected body, in instances
where Congress is disregarding constitutional limitations. A
constitutional system, to be democratic, cannot permit legis-
lative discretion to be the standard of limitation on the role of
government in the affairs of men. We do not operate under a
parliamentary system, but under a written Constitution, and it
is the function of the courts to insure constitutional democracy
by prescribing the constitutional limitations on governmental
action.
In the third section of the book, entitled "Toward an
Affirmative Constitutional Theory of Judicial Action", the
author limits his discussion to the Court's position with respect
to the confinement of the Japanese-Americans on the West
Coast by the military during World War II, the need for a
rational security program and the concept of federalism in
modern constitutional law. The treatment of the Japanese-
American cases is particularly valuable, not only as a critique of
the Court's reasoning, but as a factual presentation of the mis-
treatment of our Japanese citizens during the war. Rostow's
chief criticism of the Court in upholding the actions taken by
the military commander on the West Coast is that in so doing
the Court ". . . upheld an act of military power without a
factual record in which the justification for the act was analyzed.
Thus it created doubt as to the standards of responsibility to
which the military power will be held."
With respect to our present security program Dean Rostow
challenges the propriety of permitting summary dismissal of
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government employees suspected of being security risks by
reason of their possible political leanings or susceptibility to
blackmail, and argues for an application of procedural safe-
guards of the kind that "characterize admission to and removal
from the bar, the practice of medicine, or the conduct of
licensed callings". The test should be the employee's fitness or
suitability for the job in question and its application would
-make the government's right to inquire into a man's beliefs
and his entire history, a function of the requirements of the
job he is called upon to do."
The concept of federalism in our Constitutional system has
been a changing one. Analyzing leading decisions applying the
Commerce Clause to limit the States where there have been con-
flicts between State regulation and national needs, the author
concludes that federalism is still a vital feature of our Constitu-
tional structure, but that the problem is no longer how to
divide governmental authority between nation and state, but
"how to guide the evolution of governmental institutions in
ways that fulfill the purposes of the federal conception."-
At a time when the Supreme Court is being attacked and
criticized by interest groups of every economic and political
hue, Dean Rostow's treatment of the Court's "sovereign pre-
rogative" is a needed contribution to constitutional literature
and thought. Applying the standards of the philosophy of
legal realism, he criticizes some decisions, defends many and
expounds a theory of judicial responsibility that is certain to
affect the development of law to a great extent in coming years.
This volume is not and does not purport to be a complete
formulation of the precepts of sociological jurisprudence nor a
comprehensive analysis of the problems confronting the Court
as it strives to apply constitutional principles to the changing
needs of society. It is instead a collection of essays dealing with
diverse subjects, but having a common theme, and its value
would have been enhanced had it been more systematic in its
treatment. However, inasmuch as it is an authoritative, clear
and concise statement of the standards and principles that are
likely to govern the future development of constitutional law,
the volume can be of inestimable worth to members of the bar
and students of political science.
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